本期主要介绍税收筹划的最新论文，以及过往与该研究相关的论文，具体如下：

1.How Aggressive Tax Planning Facilitates the Diversion of Corporate Resources: Evidence from Path Analysis

Contemporary Accounting Research

First published: 08 September 2019

Andrew M.Bauer

University of Waterloo

Junxiong Fang

Fudan University

Jeffrey Pittman

Memorial University

Yinqi Zhang

American University

Yuping Zhao

University of Houston

Abstract

In measuring tunneling with inter‐corporate loans disclosed by Chinese listed companies, we analyze the underlying channels through which aggressive tax planning facilitates the diversion of corporate resources by firm insiders. Using path analysis, we document that the path from tax aggressiveness to related loans is mediated by both the additional cash flows from tax savings and the increased financial opacity from tax planning, and that additional cash flows plays a much more important role than opacity in helping controlling shareholders to divert corporate resources under the guise of tax aggressiveness. Beyond the two mediated paths, we also detect a residual, direct path from tax aggressiveness to related loans. After an exogenous shock from the government crackdown on diversionary related loans, we find the direct path is fully mediated by the two indirect paths, suggesting that tunneling via related loans only occurs at firms where insiders can mask tunneling under the cover of opacity or can justify related loans on grounds of abnormal cash flows from tax savings. Our evidence supports the notion that greater outside scrutiny increases the hurdle for, but does not entirely eradicate, diversion facilitated by tax aggressiveness. Collectively, our research lends some support to recent theory on the importance of taxes to corporate governance by demonstrating how the agency costs of tax planning allow certain shareholders to benefit from firm activities at the expense of others.

2.Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major Shareholder

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volume 67, Issues 2–3, April–May 2019

Mark Bradshaw

Boston College

Guanmin Liao

Renmin University of China

Mark (Shuai) Ma

University of Pittsburgh

Abstract

In state owned enterprises (SOEs),taxes are a dividend to the controlling shareholder, the state, but a cost to other shareholders. We examine publicly traded firms in China and find significantly lower tax avoidance by SOEs relative to non-SOEs. The differences are pronounced for locally versus centrally-owned SOEs and during the year of SOE term performance evaluations. We link our results to managerial incentives through promotion tests, finding that higher SOE tax rates are associated with higher promotion frequencies of SOE managers. Our results suggest managerial incentives and tax reporting are conditional on the ownership structure of the firm.

Keywords：Tax avoidance; Ownership structure; Agency conflicts; China; Incentives; Promotion

3.Controlling Shareholders\’ Incentive and Corporate Tax Avoidance–A Natural Experiment in China

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting

Accepted manu online: 1 March 2017

Oliver Zhen Li

National University of Singapore

Hang Liu

Dongbei University of Finance and Economics

Chenkai Ni

Fudan University

Abstract

The split share structure reform removes a significant market friction in China\’s capital market by allowing previously non-tradable shares to be freely tradable at market prices. Such a reform reduces the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as the former now care more about stock prices. We find that state-owned firms, but not non-state-owned firms, significantly increase their tax avoidance activities after the reform. We attribute this differential effect to the dual role of the government as state-owned firms’ controlling shareholder as well as the tax claimant. Further, this effect is more pronounced for state-owned firms that are more likely to be influenced by the government prior to the reform. Finally, the reform reinforces a positive association between tax avoidance and firm value. Overall, our study suggests that when controlling shareholders are more concerned about stock prices, state-owned firms engage more in tax avoidance activities to enhance firm value.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2Fjbfa.12243